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We focus on investor-state dispute settlement provisions contained in various, though far 
from all, bilateral investment treaties as a possible determinant of BIT-related effects on 
bilateral FDI flows. Our estimation results prove to be sensitive to the specification of these 
provisions as well as the inclusion of transition countries in the sample. Stricter dispute 
settlement provisions do not necessarily result in higher FDI inflows so that the effectiveness 
of BITs as a credible commitment device remains elusive. 
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1. Motivation 
Negotiations over an increasing number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have continued 
unabated even though previous empirical findings are highly ambiguous on whether host 
countries of foreign direct investment (FDI) gain attractiveness by granting more rights to, 
and offering better protection of foreign investors. Policymakers in the host countries may 
have scant regard for the academic literature, collected in Sauvant and Sachs (2009) and 
reviewed by UNCTAD (2009), berating its findings as practically irrelevant. Indeed, there 
was at least one plausible reason to do so: While earlier studies differ in terms of coverage 
and econometric approach, they typically have in common that all BITs are treated as 
homogenous – thus ignoring that the provisions contained in BITs often differ significantly.  
 
In the present analysis, we take into account that some BITs are particularly strict in binding 
the host country’s hands, whereas important provisions are completely missing in other BITs. 
The focus is on dispute settlement provisions. Experts agree that BITs are a particularly 
credible commitment device if foreign investors have direct and guaranteed access to 
international arbitration, where they can bring a claim against the host country for breaches of 
the agreement and seek monetary compensation for resulting damages (Wälde 2005; Allee 
and Peinhardt 2010). This would imply that informed foreign investors cannot reasonably be 
expected to react in the same way to BITs with and without binding investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) provisions.  
 
Nevertheless, it is far from obvious that ISDS provisions result in higher FDI flows. 
According to Poulsen (2010), “investors very rarely inquire about BITs, and when they do it 
is typically when disputes have arisen and not when they plan their investments.”
1 
Furthermore, stricter ISDS provisions obviously involve the risk that host countries are 
challenged before an arbitration panel and lose disputes through international arbitration. The 
reputation of host countries may be eroded in this way, and FDI flows may decline as a result 
(Allee and Peinhardt 2009). 
 
We test these conflicting hypotheses that have been addressed only indirectly and 
superficially in the existing literature.
2 Some studies focus on FDI from the United States 
whose BITs are assumed to be relatively strict. Nevertheless, findings from these studies are 
                                                           
1 For a similar observation, see World Bank (2005: 177). 
2 See UNCTAD (2009) for detailed references.  
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no less ambiguous. Other studies assume that all BITs signed in the more recent past include 
effective dispute settlement mechanisms. For instance, Kerner (2009) finds that recent BITs 
do promote FDI while older BITs fail to do so. Yackee (2009) represents an exception by 
using a classification of BITs concluded by 17 capital exporting countries until 2002 to show 
that earlier studies are not reliable. More specifically, Yackee finds that small changes to the 
estimation strategy of Neumayer and Spess (2005) erode the effectiveness of BITs stressed by 
these authors. This even applies when “weak” BITs without binding arbitration are excluded 
from the sample.  
 
2.  Method and data 
We follow large parts of the relevant literature and estimate a gravity-type model on the 
determinants of FDI, the baseline specification of which reads as follows: 
 
(1)       ε λ BITDS BIT   α X γ' α
FDI
FDI
ln  ijt it t ijt ijt 1 jt 0
it
ijt + μ + + α + + + = ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
2  
 
where FDIijt stands for bilateral FDI flows from country i to country j in period t, and FDIit 
for total FDI of country i in all (developing) countries included in our sample.
3 Xjt represents a 
set of control variables. Whereas BITijt corresponds to a ratified bilateral investment treaty 
without effective ISDS provisions, BITDSijt refers to a ratified treaty that contains effective 
ISDS provisions. More precisely, the dummy variable BITDS is equal to one if a BIT allows 
the investor to unilaterally initiate binding international arbitration for violations of the treaty 
obligations (full pre-consent), or at least a limited class of disputes including on the amount of 
compensation for expropriation (partial pre-consent).
4 Finally, λt is a set of year dummies, μit 
stands for source-year effects, and εijt represents the error term. 
 
We make use of Yackee’s coding of ISDS provisions in BITs to assess the effects on bilateral 
FDI flows.
5 The use of ISDS provisions has been rare at the beginning of our period of 
observation. In 1978 our sample comprises just six BITs with full pre-consent for investor-
state arbitration, while most BITs did not include ISDS provisions. In 1990 about one third of 
                                                           
3 Negative FDI flows are set equal to zero to include as many observations as possible. 
4  BITDS is equal to zero (and BIT  is equal to one) if a ratified BIT contains no ISDS provisions or just 
“promissory” ISDS, i.e., without any pre-consent or guarantee of being able to bring a claim to international 
arbitration. As detailed below, we apply alternative definitions of BITDS to check the robustness of our results. 
5 We are most grateful to Jason Webb Yackee for sharing his coding of ISDS in BITs with us.  
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all sample BITs included ISDS provisions with full pre-consent, while ISDS provisions were 
still missing in another third of the sample. By contrast, almost three quarters of all BITs in 
2002 belonged to the former category. At the same time, the inclusion of ISDS provisions 
varies across source countries of FDI. All 28 sample BITs involving the United States in 2002 
had strong ISDS provisions, in striking contrast to many BITs involving Germany and 
Switzerland which only started to include ISDS with comprehensive pre-consent from the 
1990s. 
 
We employ a fairly standard set of controlling variables. We include total real host country 
GDP and real GDP Growth, host country Inflation, host country Openness to trade, and the 
difference in GDP per capita between the source and the host country (DiffGDPpc). 
Moreover, we incorporate dummies for the existence of a bilateral or regional trade agreement 
(RTA), a double taxation treaty (DTT), and a common currency (ComCur). We expect a 
positive association of GDP, Growth, DiffGDPpc, RTA, DTT, and ComCur with FDI; the 
opposite applies to Inflation as our proxy for macroeconomic distortions. PolCon reflects 
political constraints on the executive branch and is included as a controlling variable as poor 
institutions may discourage FDI by giving rise to uncertainty.
6 
 
We take the natural logarithm of FDI, GDP, DiffGDPpc, and Inflation to reduce the skewness 
in the data. To keep the zero and negative observations, we use the following logarithmic 
transformation: 
 
( ) ( ) (2)                                                  ln     x x   y
2 1 + + =  
 
Using this transformation leaves the sign of x unchanged, while the values of x pass from a 
linear scale at small absolute values to a logarithmic scale at large values. 
 
We use three-year averages of FDI flows covering the period 1978-2004. To avoid the sample 
selection bias that has plagued most of the previous literature, we include the maximum 
number of 14 source and 83 (developing) host countries, including poor and small countries 
                                                           
6 See Appendices A and B for definitions and sources as well as summary statistics.  
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having received little FDI or none at all, for which UNCTAD’s Data Extract Service provides 
FDI data and the ISDS coding is available from Yackee.
7  
 
We apply different estimation techniques in line with Busse et al. (2010). For a start, we 
ignore the potential endogeneity of BIT and BITDS and estimate a simple ordinary least 
squares (OLS) fixed-effects model. We then estimate a fixed-effects Poisson Pseudo-
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) model to account for the fact that the sample includes a large 
number of zero observations. Finally, we account for possible endogeneity by employing a 
dynamic Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator, i.e., the system GMM 
estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
 
3. Results 
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 1, we enter BITs independently of whether they include 
effective ISDS provisions. Using the largest possible sample in column (1) reproduces the 
significantly positive effects of BITs on bilateral FDI flows found in Busse et al. (2010).
8 The 
coefficients of most controlling variables are statistically significant with the expected signs. 
In particular, we find significant evidence for both horizontal (GDP) and vertical FDI 
(DiffGDPpc). In addition to BITs, trade agreements (RTA) and tax treaties (DTT) stimulate 
FDI, whereas higher country risk (i.e., low values of PolCon) and macroeconomic instability 
(Inflation) discourage FDI. The results for the controlling variables are hardly affected when 
replicating the estimation for the smaller sample of source countries for which we have 
information on ISDS provisions (column 2). Most importantly, the BIT variable remains 
significant with a just slightly smaller coefficient.  
 
Turning to dispute settlement as the variable of principal interest, the results shown in column 
(3) suggest that any positive effect of BITs on FDI can be attributed to ISDS provisions. BITs 
without such provisions prove to be ineffective at conventional levels of significance, whereas 
BITs with ISDS provisions in the form of full or partial pre-consent on investor-state 
arbitration have significantly positive effects at the five percent level. However, this finding is 
highly sensitive to the exact specification of the BITDS variable. It is hardly surprising that 
the results on BITDS weaken considerably when extending the definition of ISDS to include 
                                                           
7 See Appendices C and D for the lists of source and host countries. 
8 In the full sample, we have 28 source countries rather than the reduced sample of 14 countries for which we 
have information on ISDS. The sample of host countries does not change.  
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so-called promissory BITs containing language that the host country may consent to 
international arbitration should the investor request so at some later date (results not shown in 
the table). Most strikingly, the same applies when using a narrower definition of effective 
ISDS, i.e., excluding BITs with only partial pre-consent. According to column (4), BITs with 
the strongest ISDS provisions (BITDS strong) are as irrelevant for bilateral FDI flows as are 
BITs without such provisions. 
 
Before offering an explanation for these surprising findings, we show that the same ambiguity 
persists when running PPML estimations instead of OLS. The results reported in columns (5) 
– (8) of Table 1 are exactly as before for all BIT-related variables. In particular, it is only 
when ISDS is defined to include both partial and full pre-consent that bilateral FDI flows are 
positively affected in a significant way. Furthermore, the same results are achieved in Table 2 
where we report the system GMM estimations accounting for possible endogeneity of BIT-
related and other explanatory variables.
9 The GMM estimations reveal that bilateral FDI 
flows are strongly path dependent. Nonetheless, the results on BITs with and without ISDS 
provisions are essentially unchanged. 
 
Focussing on our preferred GMM estimations, we assess the importance of sample selection 
for the sensitivity of results on BIT-related variables. Inspecting the data on the strength of 
ISDS provisions reveals that pre-consent is only partial in most BITs involving some 
transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, and Slovakia) as well as in BITs with China. The bargaining power 
of China may explain why pre-consent has remained incomplete until recently (Allee and 
Peinhardt 2010).
10 Nonetheless, our results on all BIT-related variables are unaffected when 
excluding China from the sample of host countries (results not shown in the table).  
 
By contrast, our results depend significantly on whether the above listed transition countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe are included in the sample. As shown in columns (5)-(8) of 
Table 2, all BIT-related variables turn completely insignificant once these countries are 
excluded. Note that this even applies to the estimations in which ISDS provisions are not 
                                                           
9 It should also be noted that alternative definitions of the dependent FDI variable, i.e., bilateral flows in absolute 
amounts or relative to the host country’s GDP, hardly affected our results on the effects of BITs with and 
without effective ISDS provisions. These results are available on request. 
10 See Berger (2010) for a detailed analysis of China’s policy towards BITs, which changed recently with China 
becoming an increasingly important source of FDI.  
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accounted for (columns 5 and 6). The latter result resembles previous findings of Busse et al. 
(2010), according to whom the positive effects of the mere existence of BITs on FDI flows 
weaken drastically once transition countries are excluded. The reason may be that BITs were 
an effective means to attract FDI to transition countries that lacked any reputation concerning 
the credibility of unilateral FDI-related measures immediately after the regime change. In 
contrast to Poulsen (2010), managers responding to an earlier survey conducted by UNCTAD 
rated BITs to be among the most important decision factors when undertaking FDI in 
transition countries (UNCTAD 2009: 51-52).  
 
Furthermore, BITs may be more relevant for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
which played a major role for FDI flows to Central and Eastern European countries, 
compared to large multinationals which often enter into direct and tailor-made contracts with 
host country governments. At the same time, SMEs are most likely to be among those 
investors that rarely inquire about the exact contents of BITs “until some issue arises when its 
provisions may be relevant” (World Bank 2005: 177). This could explain why BITs 
stimulated FDI flows to Central and Eastern European countries even though ISDS provisions 
were not particularly strong in BITs with these host countries. 
 
4. Summary 
UNCTAD (2009: 37) has spotted a shift in the recent empirical literature towards a more 
positive assessment of the impact of BITs on FDI. This could be because BITs have become 
more binding over time in offering credible investor protection. Our results on ISDS 
provisions do not support this view, even though it is the investor's “ability to access a 
tribunal outside the sway of the Host State which is the principle advantage of a modern 
investment treaty” (Wälde 2005: 194). It rather appears that the mere existence of BITs has 
helped reputation building in a relatively small sub-set of host countries, notably in some 
post-socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe whose BITs did not contain ISDS 
provisions in the strictest form. 
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Table 1: BITs and Dispute Settlement Provisions, OLS and PPML Estimations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation technique: OLS  OLS OLS OLS  PPML  PPML  PPML  PPML 
ln  (GDP)  0.193*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.168*** 0.461*** 0.503*** 0.502*** 0.472*** 
  (5.47) (3.13) (3.12) (2.95) (3.91) (2.81) (2.81) (2.64) 
ln (DiffGDPpc)  0.00825***  0.0798  0.0796  0.0912  0.0763***  0.300  0.299  0.324 
  (3.54) (0.58) (0.58) (0.67) (4.52) (0.70) (0.70) (0.75) 
Growth 0.00113  0.00202  0.00202  0.00198  0.0257***  0.0205***  0.0205***  0.0207*** 
  (1.21) (1.47) (1.47) (1.43) (4.59) (3.17) (3.18) (3.21) 
ln  (Inflation)  -0.00714*  -0.00187 -0.00189 -0.00365 -0.0114 -0.00460  -0.00478  -0.00789 
  (-1.93) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.76) (-0.75) (-0.26) (-0.27) (-0.44) 
Openness  0.000240 0.000306 0.000307 0.000363 -0.000692 0.00126  0.00123  0.00108 
  (0.74) (0.70) (0.70) (0.82) (-0.50) (0.74) (0.72) (0.63) 
RTA 0.180***  0.127*  0.127*  0.151**  0.0797  0.101  0.103  0.116 
  (2.68) (1.81) (1.81) (2.15) (0.97) (0.97) (0.98) (1.10) 
PolCon  0.110*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.131***  0.390**  0.428**  0.428**  0.425** 
  (3.183)  (2.76) (2.76) (2.78) (2.52) (2.30) (2.30) (2.28) 
ComCur  0.112  0.157*  0.157*  0.167**  0.172 0.214 0.215 0.241 
  (1.47) (1.95) (1.95) (2.09) (0.92) (1.14) (1.14) (1.28) 
DTT  0.104**  0.0430 0.0434 0.0700 0.0491 0.0421 0.0403 0.0740 
  (2.22) (0.83) (0.83) (1.35) (0.63) (0.45) (0.42) (0.78) 
BIT  all  0.106***  0.0812**    0.181***  0.204**     
  (3.39)  (2.35)    (2.59)  (2.32)    
BIT without DS      0.0768        0.281   
     (0.85)      (0.92)  
BITDS     0.0801**       0.190**   
     (2.21)      (2.17)  
BIT without strong DS        -0.0663        -0.0257 
      (-0.60)      (-0.12) 
BITDS  strong      -0.0264      -0.0257 
      (-0.79)      (-0.28) 
Observations  14,077  7,510 7,510 7,510  14,077  7,510 7,510 7,510 
Country  pairs  2,313 1,161 1,161 1,161 2,313 1,161 1,161 1,161 
R
2  (within)  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01      
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects; t-values, reported in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity; due to space constraints, the coefficients for the 
year dummies are not shown; likewise, source-year effects are always included but not displayed; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 
10% level.    
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Table 2: BITs and Dispute Settlement Provisions, System GMM Estimations 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Country sample: all  all  all  all  excl. CEE  excl. CEE  excl. CEE  excl. CEE 
ln (FDIt-1)  0.699***  0.722*** 0.697*** 0.661*** 0.640*** 0.673***  0.611*** 0.619*** 
  (11.90)  (12.73) (12.40) (12.45) (10.78) (11.41)  (10.97) (11.06) 
ln (FD1t-2) 0.0418  0.0229  0.0397  0.043  0.118**  0.0893  0.124**  0.117** 
  (0.72)  (0.39) (0.69) (0.84) (2.13) (1.48)  (2.16) (2.09) 
ln  (GDP)  0.0437***  0.0492*** 0.0504*** 0.0584*** 0.0422*** 0.0533***  0.0598*** 0.0597*** 
  (4.08)  (3.27) (3.26) (3.69) (3.69) (3.40)  (3.63) (3.64) 
ln (DiffGDPpc)  0.00309  0.00348  0.00325  0.00298  -0.00117  0.00277  0.00352  0.00339 
 (0.75)  (1.40)  (1.25)  (1.10)  (-1.22)  (1.22)  (1.43)  (1.36) 
Growth 0.00403*** 0.00182  0.00169  0.00215  0.00435*** 0.00289**  0.00265**  0.00328** 
  (3.41)  (1.27) (1.20) (1.43) (3.87) (2.15)  (1.98) (2.31) 
ln (Inflation)  -0.000123  0.000934  -0.000880  -0.00145 0.00212 -0.00151  -0.00411  -0.000643 
  (-0.024)  (0.14) (-0.13) (-0.22) (0.41) (-0.24)  (-0.64)  (-0.092) 
Openness -0.000349  0.000284  0.000260  0.000331  -0.000361  0.000200  0.000281  0.000234 
 (-1.38)  (0.97)  (0.90)  (1.09)  (-1.54)  (0.74)  (1.01)  (0.82) 
RTA  0.112**  0.0783  0.0756 0.108**  0.111** 0.0904 0.0908 0.0977* 
  (2.49)  (1.61) (1.53) (2.20) (2.12) (1.64)  (1.59) (1.73) 
PolCon  0.000365  0.000536 -0.00306  0.0347  0.0133  -0.0226 -0.0179 0.000702 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (-0.052)  (0.59)  (0.30)  (-0.42)  (-0.32)  (0.013) 
ComCur -0.0267  -0.000765  -0.0119  0.00296  0.000748  0.0309  0.0249  0.0328 
 (-0.65)  (-0.018)  (-0.27)  (0.06)  (0.018)  (0.72)  (0.57)  (0.74) 
DTT  0.157***  0.155*** 0.169*** 0.193*** 0.157*** 0.121***  0.135*** 0.139*** 
  (3.66)  (3.79) (4.21) (4.45) (3.61) (3.14)  (3.43) (3.46) 
BIT all  0.0572*  0.0692*      0.0240  0.00182     
 (1.74)  (1.90)      (0.75)  (0.057)     
BIT without DS      -0.0492        -0.0665   
     (-1.07)       (-1.50)  
BITDS      0.0657**      -0.00467   
      (1.95)      (-0.16)   
BIT  without         -0.00839       -0.000578 
    strong DS        (-0.09)        (-0.0065) 
BITDS strong         -0.0239        -0.0214 
       (-0.80)        (-0.73) 
Observations  9,972  5,506 5,506 5,506 9,373 5172 5172 5172 
Country  pairs  2,216  1,155 1,155 1,155 2,071 1078 1078 1078 
Sargan (p-value)
1  0.13  0.16 0.13 0.22 0.11 0.18  0.16 0.34 
AB 2 (p-value)
2  0.27  0.10 0.16 0.13 0.83 0.32  0.55 0.50 
Instruments (lags)  316 (2 to 6) 316 (2 to 6)  362 (2 to 6) 362 (2 to 6) 316 (2 to 6) 316 (2 to 6) 362 (2 to 6)  362 (2 to 6)
Notes: See Table 1; ***  significant at 1%  level; **  significant at 5%  level; *  significant at 10%  level; 
Estimations are based on one-step system-GMM estimator with robust standard errors; 
1 Sargan-test of 
overidentification; 
2 Arellano-Bond-test that second-order autocorrelation in residuals is 0.  
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
FDI  Bilateral FDI flows from source to host country in % of total 
FDI from source country to all developing countries included 
in our sample 
UNCTAD (2010a) 
GDP  Real GDP, constant 2000 US$  World Bank (2010) 
DiffGDPpc Difference  between  source and host countries’ GDP per 
capita, constant 2000 US$ 
World Bank (2010) 
Growth  Real GDP growth rate of host country in %  World Bank (2010) 
Inflation  Inflation rate of host country in % (GDP deflator)  World Bank (2010) 
Openness  Sum of imports and exports in % of GDP (host country)  World Bank (2010) 
BIT all  Bilateral investment treaty, ratified between source and host 
country  UNCTAD (2010b) 
BITDS  Bilateral investment treaty with investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanism with comprehensive or partial pre-
consent  
made available by 
Jason Webb Yackee 
BITDS strong  Bilateral investment treaty with investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanism with comprehensive pre-consent 
made available by 
Jason Webb Yackee 
DTT  Double taxation treaty, ratified between source and host 
country 
IBFD (2010) 
ComCur  Common currency between source and host country  Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) 
RTA  Dummy regional trade agreement  WTO (2010) 
PolCon  Political constraints III, Henisz database, range from 0 to 1  Henisz (2000) 
 
 
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics for the Main Variables 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
ln  (FDI)  14,077  0.30 0.83  0 5.30 
ln (GDP)  14,077  23.26  1.70  19.14  28.07 
ln (DiffGDPpc)  14,077  8.76  4.54  -10.15  11.21 
Growth 14,077  3.46  5.58  -18.20  77.70 
ln  (Inflation)  14,077  3.02 1.66  -3.25 9.43 
Openness 14,077  73.10  39.86  9.31  245.80 
BIT all  14,077  0.17  0.37  0  1 
BIT all (reduced sample)  7,510  0.26  0.43  0  1 
BITDS 7,510  0.19  0.38  0  1 
BITDS strong  7,510  0.16  0.36  0  1 
DTT 14,077  0.21  0.40  0  1 
ComCurrency 14,077  0.01  0.10  0  1 
RTA 14,077  0.05  0.21  0  1 
PolCon  14,077  0.25 0.20  0 0.68 
 
 
Appendix C: Source Country Sample 
Argentina,  Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Portugal,  Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States, Venezuela 
Note: Source countries with information on dispute settlement in italics. 
  
 
 
13
 
Appendix D: Host Country Sample 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El  Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Estonia, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
 